St. Louis and the Consequences of Consolidation

Anheuser-Busch’s offices in New York.

Brian Feldman’s piece about how consolidation killed St. Louis got a lot of attention when it came out last year.  He argues that a rollback of anti-trust regulations that allowed industrial consolidation was the silent killer of what were once key regional business capitals like St. Louis.

Interestingly, his focus was on something you may not know ever existed in St. Louis, major advertising agencies.

If there is a living embodiment of the St. Louis advertising industry, it’s Charles Claggett Jr. The former creative director at D’Arcy, long one of the city’s largest agencies, he retired in 2000, two years before the French firm Publicis acquired the agency. One of his many claims to fame is that in 1979, he and his team penned “This Bud’s for You”—the slogan widely credited for helping St. Louis-based brewing staple Anheuser-Busch eclipse Miller during the 1980s beer wars….Another claim to Claggett’s fame is his father, Charles Claggett Sr., who led the city’s oldest and largest agency, Gardner, in the late 1950s and the 1960s. During his tenure, the elder Claggett oversaw accounts such as John Deere, Ralston Purina, and Jack Daniel’s.

And it wasn’t just Gardner and D’Arcy—whose twelve offices now fanned out across North America, as far as Havana—that flourished in mid-century St. Louis. With its ample supply of locally owned businesses as potential clients, the city supported a vibrant start-up ad agency scene. These new firms trained up-and-coming talent, developed cutting-edge campaigns, and often grew to become regional or national in scope, enriching the metro area by bringing in revenue from outside of it.

By the 1960s, St. Louis’s advertising industry had effectively developed into what economists call an “industry cluster.” Though the city’s agencies competed with each other, their sheer number created citywide competitive advantages: a deep bench of talent that moved in and out of agencies, spreading ideas and transferring know-how; a network of experienced, low-cost suppliers (printers, recording studios); and a reputation for quality that attracted national and international clients. All of it was built on the foundation of locally owned companies. These firms provided a steady supply of commissions facilitated by personal connections: account executives at the agencies and the senior executives at the corporations knew each other—from charitable events, from rounds of golf, or from attending the same high school.

D’Arcy followed a similar trajectory. In 1985, it merged with NYC-based Benton & Bowles to become DMB&B, a deal that saw the headquarters and executive decision-making shift to New York. The St. Louis office still handled long-standing accounts like Mars/M&M and Anheuser-Busch, but NYC now made “above-the-rim” decisions. As Claggett put it, “The agency slowly became just a branch office competing for accounts.”

The turning point came one day in 1994, when, unbeknown to the St. Louis office, the agency’s NYC-based media-buying unit signed a $25 million deal with Anheuser-Busch’s archrival, Miller, then lied about it. Anheuser-Busch’s volatile owner, August Busch III, immediately cut ties with D’Arcy, costing the agency $422 million in billings. One D’Arcy copywriter quipped, “When you lose Bud, you’ve lost it all.” Two years later, the office lost its $140 million Blockbuster account to New York. The agency closed its St. Louis doors in 2002.

In the years since the St. Louis advertising cluster disintegrated, the entire industry has taken a major hit as the Internet has disrupted its traditional business model. U.S. ad agencies today have fewer employees than they did in 2000.

One of the companies that got bought out in St. Louis was Anheuser-Busch itself, a company so synonymous with the city that its name might as well be “Anheuser-Busch, St. Louis, Missouri.” The buyer was Belgium-based InBev, which was controlled (and still is I believe) by a group of Brazilian investors. Three years after the 2008 deal, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch looked back at the consequences for the company and the city.

They still make big decisions here, the kind of big-spending, imaginative deals that made this place so envied. But now executives in New York City sometimes sign off on them, too….Three years out, some things are clear. A-B is a diminished but still huge, powerful presence. The worst of the cost-cutting appears over. The brewery and some executive functions have remained in St. Louis. But the corporate culture of the old A-B — tradition-bound, perfectionist, focused more on dominating the beer market than making money — has given way to an aggressive austerity.

The extensive cost-cutting has squeezed more profits out of A-B, but questions remain over whether the company’s new bosses can grow brands and sell more beer.  And St. Louis is no longer the center of the company universe. A-B is now the U.S. subsidiary of A-B InBev. With that, old assumptions — and wistful illusions — about the relationship between the company and the city have changed, too.

This is pretty well known, I believe. What’s less known, perhaps outside of St. Louis, is that in 2014 Anheuser-Busch announced it would be moving brand management and other functions from St. Louis to New York City, opening what it termed its “commercial strategy office.”

Today the A-B commercial strategy office employs about 400 people in a very cool modern office in Chelsea. While the firm is still technically based in St. Louis and employs a lot of people there, including a lot of management people such its supply chain leadership, this represents a significant loss of high talent positions for that city.

Why did A-B open an NYC? Well, InBev was already there. Chicago, the most logical place for a consumer business like A-B, had already landed the Miller-Coors HQ. I don’t have any insights on that, but would speculate it played a role in the choice of New York.

But what’s most troubling for St. Louis and many other similar cities is that A-B’s main reason for staffing up in New York was to be closer to its ad agency partners. In other words, we are seeing knock on effects from previous consolidations and the rise of global cities as key financial and producer services nodes.

First consolidation wiped out St. Louis’ national scale ad agencies. Then the loss of those agencies make it hard to keep ahold of corporate marketing and other functions.

This was one of the key things I honed in on back in 2008 when I first wrote about the trend of HQs moving back to the global city. Saskia Sassen’s work on the revival of the global city noted the growth in specialized financial and producer services (like advertising). The rebirth of the global city was not built on traditional corporate HQ growth.

But then down the road, corporations started to restructure their HQs into what I term “executive headquarters”, with only top executive functions – generally only 500 at most – now part of the HQ. And that the HQ was now being drawn back to the global city in order to take advantage of the services infrastructure there. I noted how Mead-Johnson Nutritionals (makers of Enfamil baby formula) had followed this formula when it moved from Evansville, Indiana to Chicago. Here’s what the media said at the time:

Working in a large city will make it easier to conduct business throughout the world. Mead Johnson makes Enfamil and similar products and about half of its sales come from overseas. Having offices near Chicago, for instance, will place executives in close proximity to global-business consultants, leaders in the field of nutrition and an international airport.

Today we see that proximity to services providers, international airports, and the ability to recruit top global talent are all drivers of this. To date I’ve mostly noticed that the losing locations were clearly subscale cities like Evansville or Peoria. Now with Connecticut losing GE, it’s affecting larger business markets as well.

A-B’s New York office isn’t technically an executive headquarters, but it has some of the same characteristics. This isn’t about anything nefarious. It’s about companies doing what they think they need to do to address market realities. Mass market beer brands like Bud Light are in decline industry-wide. These kinds of moves are part of trying to stay market relevant. (A-B also just changed CEOs in response).

This is definitely a trend to keep an eye on since it will have a big effect on whether or not legacy business cities like St. Louis in the 1-3 million metro area range will be able to continue conducting business as the same level they’ve been used to doing. I think there is a ton of risk here in many cities, especially in the Midwest.

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/11/21/st-louis-and-the-consequences-of-consolidation/

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How New York Benefits From Out of Town Wealth

One of the things I’ve constantly noticed in New York is how much out of town money goes into boosting the cultural life of the city. I always like looking at the list of sponsors of cultural events and institutions to see who is backing them. Not uncommonly I see out of town names here.

For example, consider all the sums of money that foreign countries spend to market their nation’s culture in New York. Foreign governments are big funders of cultural events such as film festivals here. Now, that’s not totally unique to New York. Consulates around the country routinely do the same. But the scale of what I see here is pretty big.

The government of France has a big cultural mission housed in a Fifth Avenue mansion (see photo above). The government of Korea runs a similar operation. I presume there are many other countries undertaking special purpose cultural marketing in NYC.

It would be interesting research to track down the total amount of foreign government cultural marketing in the US, and what percentage of it is spent in New York City.

A second category is money that was made elsewhere than then gravitated to New York, either because the people who earned it moved there, or because they decided to make a splash in New York.

The Frick Collection museum, for example, is the home and art collection of a guy who made his money in Pittsburgh. (A lot of his art is still there). Sid Richardson Bass, a member of the Texas oil family, moved to NYC and became a major patron of the arts.

Sybil Harrington, a Texas oil heiress, became a huge patron of the Metropolitan Opera. She donated about $30 million to it, I believe mostly in the 70s and 80s, when that was a much bigger deal than it would be today. Similarly, the Met Opera continues to benefit from the largess of the “Gramma Fisher Foundation, Marshalltown Iowa.” Founder Bill Fisher was a Marshalltown industrialist and major patron of American opera companies. He was on the board of the Met for 35 years. These kinds of money flows continue today. Ken Griffin, Illinois’ richest man, gave MoMA $40 million a couple years ago. For the bulk of American art museums that would be their biggest contribution ever.

Another interesting research project would be to find out how much money has and does flow into New York from people who either made their fortune elsewhere then moved to NYC, or from just straight-up out of town donors.

Again, other cities benefit from this to some extent. But I suspect nothing like one the scale of New York.

The fact that so much foreign government and out of town money pours into New York culture is another of the very unique forces that have upheld the city in its preeminent position over the years.

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/11/20/how-new-york-benefits-from-out-of-town-wealth/

Superstar Effect: High Digital Jobs Edition

Brookings has a new study out called “Digitization and the American Workforce” looking at the growth of the digitization of the American economy. They track the dramatically increasing levels of digitization of all jobs, not just specifically high tech ones, and various implications of that. The study is definitely worth checking out.

They also segregate out what they call “high digital jobs” that involve the greatest degrees of digitization. These are disproportionately in usual suspects metro areas:

Not only is there variation in high digital jobs share, there is divergence as well. As they note:

This more high tech-favoring measure exposes a much wider range of 2016 metro digitalization scores, ranging from nearly 38 percent of local employment in highly digital occupations in San Jose to just 14.6 percent in Stockton-Lodi, Calif. The list of the most digitalized metros reads like a gazetteer of the largest, best-established tech hubs in the nation—ranging from Washington, Seattle, San Francisco, and Boston to fast- followers like Austin and Denver and to university towns such as Madison and Raleigh.

Not only do metros’ high-skill digitalization ratings vary sharply; they are also diverging. In this regard, the digital rich are getting richer, a trend that can be seen in the 100-metro scatterplot in Figure 13. The higher a metro area’s 2002 share of highly digital occupations the greater the growth of its share of jobs in such occupations in the years 2002 to 2016. For example, San Jose, Washington, and Austin—with highly digital employment shares in excess of 10 percent in 2002—have all increased their shares by more than 20 percentage points since then. By contrast, metros with low starting presence in highly digital occupations (such as as Stockton; Youngstown, Ohio; and McAllen, Texas), all with high-digital job shares of less than 2 percent in 2002, have seen much slower employment growth in highly digital occupations—more along the lines of 10 percentage points. In short, a high initial digital score predicts faster future digitalization.

This finding is probably more a look at divergence rather than a true superstar effect, but is still very interesting.

Click through to read the whole study.

 

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/11/17/superstar-effect-high-digital-jobs-edition/

New York’s Transit System Needs More Than Just Money

A new issue brief from my Manhattan Institute and City Journal colleague Nicole Gelinas takes a look at New York’s transit problems. The media focus has been on money, which she agrees is needed. But critical reforms are also required if things are to improve.

The report is called “Not by Money Alone.” Here’s an excerpt:

The answer to the MTA’s current woes, then, is not to cut back on the financial resources that it devotes to capital investment. In fact, under the right conditions, the MTA should increase such investments.

[But] is the MTA investing in the right projects?

The answer to this question, unfortunately, is no. The MTA is investing its money in the wrong projects relative to ridership and population growth. The current five-year capital plan devotes 71% of its expansion budget to the region’s two commuter railroads (Figure 4), 10 times the commuter railroad’s 7% share of MTA ridership (Figure 5). Under this plan, the MTA will invest a further $2.4 billion in the $10.2 billion East Side Access project to connect LIRR trains to Grand Central Terminal rather than to Penn Station, as well as $2 billion in building a third track on the LIRR’s main line, for example.

Click through to read the whole thing.

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/11/14/new-yorks-transit-system-needs-more-than-just-money/

Home Equity Wealth at New High

The latest flow-of-funds data from the Federal Reserve confirmed that home-equity wealth reached a new nominal high this year:  $13.9 trillion at mid-2017, $0.5 trillion above the 2006 peak and more than double the $6.0 trillion amount at the trough of the Great Recession.[1]  While several factors will affect aggregate home equity, it’s clear that much of the recovery in home-equity wealth is due to the rebound in home values: The S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller Index for the U.S. was up 40 percent (seasonally adjusted) through June from its February 2012 nadir.

Comparing annual home-price growth with the annual change in home equity per homeowner shows a strong correlation (Exhibit 1).  When prices are stagnant of falling, equity typically declines.  Conversely, price growth generally supports equity accumulation, with faster appreciation leading to larger amounts of equity creation.  Home-equity wealth is an important component of family savings, accounting for about 20 percent of homeowners’ net worth, on average.[2]

Home-value growth has also restored net worth to many homeowners who had negative equity.  At the end of 2009, 12.2 million homeowners had negative equity, or 26 percent of all owners with a mortgage.  Price appreciation, along with amortization and loan curtailments, has helped pull ‘underwater’ owners ‘above water.’ (Exhibit 2) For example, if all homes rise in value by 5 percent during the next 12 months, about 500,000 homeowners will regain a positive net housing wealth position.

Of course, price appreciation is not uniform but varies across neighborhoods.  Nationally, 5.4 percent of homeowners with a mortgage had negative equity at mid-year, but that percentage varied from zero to about 20 percent across counties. (Exhibit 3) Among the more populous counties, the negative equity percentage varied from 0.5 percent in San Mateo (California) to 16.8 percent in Osceola (Florida).  Areas where home values have recovered and are above their pre-recession peak tend to have the lowest percentage of negative equity homeowners, and some of the largest home-equity wealth amounts.

If there is a 5 percent rise in the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller Index in the coming year, then we should see an additional $1 trillion in home-equity wealth created, setting another new high.

[1] Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, “Financial Accounts of the United States,” Second Quarter 2017, Table B.101, rows 4 and 33.

[2] The ratio of mean home-equity wealth to mean net worth for homeowners was 20.4% in 2013 and 19.1% in 2016; see “Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 2017 (Vol. 103, No. 3), pp. 13 and 26.


from S&P Dow Jones Indices – HousingViews
http://www.housingviews.com/2017/11/13/home-equity-wealth-at-new-high/

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Infrastructure Privatizations

I was recently a guest on a podcast called The Private Side of Public Work. In this episode I talk about privatization, good and bad rationales, how to pick projects, what kinds of gotcha’s to look out for, and how privatization has changed over the last two decades. It’s a nice overview of a lot of my thinking on the topic.

https://app.stitcher.com/splayer/f/140731/51904137

If the podcast player doesn’t display for you, click over to listen on Stitcher.

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/11/13/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-of-infrastructure-privatizations/

Comparing Nashville and Other Select Light Rail Cities

In light of the proposed light rail system in Nashville, here are some comparative stats between Nashville and some other light rail cities. I picked these sources because they provide a basis for consistent numbers across cities. By all means do look to update these to more recent figure.

City Center Jobs

Here are the number of jobs within three miles of the city center in 2011, as reported by City Observatory.

  • Los Angeles 340,465
  • Minneapolis 247,582
  • Dallas: 239,607
  • Denver 212,029
  • Portland 201,915
  • Houston 197,361
  • Charlotte 149,211
  • Nashville 143,240
  • Salt Lake City N/A

Urban Core Residents

Here are the number of people in “close in neighborhoods” within three miles of the city center in 2010, as reported by City Observatory.

  • Denver: 31,678
  • Minneapolis: 25,156
  • Portland: 24,860
  • Los Angeles: 20,161
  • Houston: 18,845
  • Dallas: 17,256
  • Salt Lake City: 11,543
  • Charlotte: 10,992
  • Nashville 7,720

Downtown Office Space

Square feet of downtown office space in 2015, according to Colliers.

  • Houston: 41,930,060
  • Denver: 34,683,003
  • Portland: 34,238,614
  • Minneapolis: 33,372,876
  • Dallas: 32,625,514
  • Los Angeles: 32,258,544
  • Charlotte: 22,517,225
  • Nashville: 13,150,674
  • Salt Lake City N/A

 

from Aaron M. Renn
http://www.urbanophile.com/2017/11/10/comparing-nashville-and-other-select-light-rail-cities/